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Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory
Arbitration, and State Constitutional
Jury-Trial Rights
By STEPHEN J. WARE*
PROFESSOR JEAN STERNLIGHT believes that courts should be
more reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements than they are to en-
force contracts generally.' In other words, she believes that contract
law's standards of consent are not as high as the standards of consent
that should be applied to arbitration agreements. This belief puts her
at odds with the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"),2 which requires
courts to enforce arbitration agreements "save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,"3 and with
the Supreme Court, which continues to recognize that the FAA places
arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts."4
While neither the legislative norjudicial branch has yet to change
the law to better reflect her beliefs, Professor Sternlight has certainly
been persistent in advancing them. Her persistence is evidenced by
several thoughtful articles making a variety of arguments against the
prevailing contractual approach to arbitration law. 5 One of her argu-
ments is that the constitutional right to ajury trial forbids courts from
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas. Thanks to Chris Drahozal and Doug Cole.
1. See infra note 5.
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 2. On the incompatibility of Sternlight's views and FAA section 2, see
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Juy-Waiver Clauses and Other Contractual Waivers of Con-
stitutional Rights, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. § IV (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Arbitra-
tion Clauses].
4. E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000); Doctor's Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 271 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Sev-
enth Amendment Right to a jury Trial, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669 (2001) [hereinafter
Mandatory Arbitration]; Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment ofJury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due
Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Rethinking Constitutionality]; Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbi-
tration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996) [hereinafter Panacea].
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
applying contract-law standards of consent to arbitration agreements.
Sternlight argues that the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution and similar state constitutional provisions instead require
courts to hold arbitration agreements to a higher "knowing-consent"
standard.6 Her argument with respect to the federal constitution is
found primarily in an article she published a few years ago, Mandatory
Binding Arbitration and Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury
Trial,7 while her argument with respect to state constitutions is found
in her contribution to this symposium. 8 The central normative thesis
of her federal article, that the Seventh Amendment requires federal
courts to apply knowing-consent standards, rather than contract-law
standards, to arbitration agreements, is (I believe) refuted by my arti-
cle, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses and Other Contractual Waivers
of Constitutional Rights.9 The central normative thesis of her state arti-
cle, that many state constitutions require state courts to apply know-
ing-consent standards to arbitration agreements, may or may not be
refuted by this article. Whether the FAA preempts such state constitu-
tions is, I conclude below, an open question lacking a clear or easy
answer.
I. Terminology
Before delving into the particulars of the law on arbitration and
jury-trial rights, it will be helpful to define some terms and, in the
course of doing so, compare my language with that of Professor Ster-
nlight's. I believe that a dispute should be sent to arbitration if the
parties have "voluntarily" agreed to arbitrate that dispute. By contrast,
I am generally opposed to "mandatory" arbitration. I use the terms
voluntary and mandatory as antonyms, and I laud voluntary arbitra-
tion while criticizing mandatory arbitration. All the same can be said
of Professor Sternlight. Nevertheless, she and I disagree about the way
many cases should be decided because we disagree so fundamentally
about when arbitration is voluntary and when it is mandatory.
Part of our disagreement may just be semantic. Words like volun-
tary and mandatory have a lot of rhetorical power in debates about
6. The phrase "knowing-consent" is my summary of a variety of verbal formulations
used by Sternlight and others, including courts. See Arbitration Clauses, supra note 3, at
§ III.B.
7. See generally Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 5, at 677-94.
8. Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the
Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 17, 24-25 (2003).
9. See generally Arbitration Clauses, supra note 3, at §§ II., III.
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the law. It is perhaps a natural human tendency for a debater to de-
fine words in ways that enable him or her to harness as much of that
rhetorical power as possible. Certainly, I will resist being characterized
as an advocate for making arbitration mandatory or, for that matter,
as an advocate for making much else mandatory.
What Sternlight calls mandatory arbitration is better called con-
tractual arbitration because it, unlike some other arbitration, does not
occur unless the parties to the arbitration have previously formed a
contract stating their agreement to arbitrate the dispute.10 Arbitration
is not mandatory when it arises out of a contract, because contracts
are formed voluntarily. The rare cases in which consent to a contract
is involuntary-as when "A grasps B's hand and compels B by physical
force to write his name" to the signature line of a contract, I I or when
A puts a gun to B's head and says "sign or I'll shoot"-result in con-
tracts that are voidable on the ground of duress. 12 In the absence of
duress, it is inaccurate, as well as overly dramatic, to say that a contract
containing an arbitration clause results in arbitration that is involun-
tary or mandatory.
WhatJean Sternlight and others are complaining about is not du-
ress. They are complaining about arbitration clauses found in form
contracts presented take-it-or-leave-it to consumers, employees, and
other ordinary individuals. Sternlight and others denigrate these form
contracts as adhesion contracts,1 3 and rightly point out that the adher-
ing party is unlikely to read or understand the arbitration clause and
may not even know there is an arbitration clause on the form.' 4
That is a serious point. And it is a point that applies to a wide
range of contracts, not just to arbitration agreements. It has long been
a clich6 among contracts scholars that mass-produced form contracts
10. StephenJ. Ware, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.2 (2001).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1979).
12. See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 83, 109 n.120 (1996) (comparing two meanings of involuntary: non-volitional and
volitional but coerced).
13. See, e.g.,Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the US. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 831, 864 n.1 (2002) ("I put the term 'mandatory' in quotes as a nod to those who
insist that arbitration imposed through contracts of adhesion should be categorized as vol-
untary. Personally, however, I cannot understand how a person can be said to have 'volun-
tarily' accepted arbitration when it is part of a small print contract of adhesion. Thus, in
the remainder of the article I will use the term 'mandatory' without putting it in quotation
marks.").
14. Panacea, supra note 5, at 676 ("Few, if any, would be foolish enough to argue that
most employees and consumers actually read and understand the form contracts that they
sign which commit them to binding arbitration.").
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far outnumber custom-drafted contracts.15 The prevalence of adhe-
sion contracts has been a subject of debate among courts and com-
mentators for many generations.' 6 All that has been said on all sides
of that rich debate applies to form contracts with arbitration clauses
just as much as it applies to form contracts without arbitration clauses.
But it should be clear, however, that those who are arguing for non-
enforcement of some or all clauses on form contracts are arguing for
non-enforcement because the clauses are too favorable to the drafting
party (substantively unconscionable) and/or because the clauses gen-
erally do not receive the knowing consent of the non-drafting party,
but not because the contracts containing the clauses are mandatory or
involuntary. The non-drafting party is always free, in the absence of
duress, to simply walk away from the proposed contract.
This is true even if the form contracts of an entire industry all
have many of the same clauses. An example is the mortgage (or secur-
ity interest), a common clause of loan agreements and what enables
the lender to take collateral from the borrower if the borrower de-
faults on the loan. I recently borrowed $220,000. The lender insisted
that I grant it a mortgage on my home. This clause was non-negotia-
ble, take-it-or-leave-it. I am confident that other lenders, when faced
with my request for a loan of that amount, would also have insisted on
this same non-negotiable clause. I am also confident that the vast ma-
jority of other people borrowing that amount of money would have no
choice but to accept this clause as well. Does that make my mortgage
payments involuntary or mandatory? Of course not. I could have
rented a home or perhaps bought a smaller home without borrowed
15. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
making Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) (estimating that 99% of all contracts were
standard form agreements).
16. See, e.g., Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917); Edwin
W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. REV. 198 (1919); Friedrich
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV.
629 (1943); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs 362
(1960).
Some of the many recent entrants in this debate include Jean Braucher, The Failed
Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and Its Lessons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts,
7J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 393 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002); Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Con-
tracts: A Comparative Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1 (2002); Donald
B. King, Standard Form Contracts: A Call for Reality, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 909 (2000); R. Ted
Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct
for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1996); Lee Goldman, My Way and the High-
way: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U.
L. REV. 700 (1992); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Eco-
nomics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REv. 583 (1990).
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funds. There are always alternatives, albeit more and less attractive
ones. I consented, in the absence of duress, to a contract containing
the lending industry's take-it-or-leave-it clause, just as countless people
consent, in the absence of duress, to contracts containing take-it-or-
leave-it arbitration clauses. Calling the results of these routine transac-
tions mandatory arbitration is no more sensible than referring to
mandatory mortgages. Both the arbitration and the mortgage are en-
tirely voluntary.
I ask Professor Sternlight (and others) to stop calling contractual
arbitration-mandatory arbitration. Or, Jean, if you decide that you
must continue calling it mandatory arbitration then I believe your
readers deserve an account of how you are defining your terms. How
are you deciding what is mandatory and what is, its opposite, volun-
tary?1 7 I laid out my definitions of these terms ten articles ago, with
lengthy footnotes citing a wide variety of philosophical, as well as legal
sources.1 8 I believe that you need to do likewise because the line be-
tween what is voluntary and what is mandatory is too important to
leave unexplained. It is too facile and insufficiently precise to say that
if all the parties to an arbitration agreement are "businesses" or "so-
17. See IAN R. MACNEIL, RIcI-IA.D E. SPEIDEL, THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, G. RICHARD
SHELL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw 2:36 n.5 (1995).
[The term "mandatory"] is sometimes used to describe arbitration resulting from
agreements to arbitrate future disputes, since once an enforceable agreement has
been made, arbitration is "mandatory." This is extremely confusing language be-
cause it ignores altogether the consensual element in contracts .... [I]ts usage
resolves linguistically the issues of the reality of consent and the effect to be given
to consent by fiat, rather than by analysis revealing the nature of the issues.
Id.
18. See Ware, supra note 12, at 103-13. That was my first of ten (this is the eleventh)
articles engaging Professor Sternlight and others in the debate over the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. The other nine articles in which I have cited Sternlight are Ste-
phen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitu-
tional Rights, 67 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2004); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer
and Employment Arbitration Law in Comparative Perspective: The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56
U. MIAMI L. REv. 865 (2002); StephenJ. Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in the Arbitration-Law
Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the UDRP, 6J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 129 (2002);
Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agree-
ments, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89 (2001) [hereinafter Paying the Price]; Stephen J. Ware, The
Effects ofGilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO
ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 735 (2001) [hereinafter Effects ofGilmer]; Stephen J. Ware, Arbitra-
tion and Assimilation, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1053 (2000); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from
Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1999); Stephen
J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 195 (1998);
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1001 (1996) [hereinafter Arbitration After Doctor's Assocs.].
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phisticated businesses"' 9 then the arbitration is voluntary, but if one
of the parties is a "little guy" then arbitration is mandatory. 20
A further reason for referring to arbitration arising out of adhe-
sion contracts as contractual, rather than mandatory, is that doing so
reserves the word mandatory for arbitration that really is mandatory-
arbitration that occurs even though the parties have not contracted
for it. For example, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act requires chemical manufacturers to arbitrate certain disputes
with each other even though neither of them contracted for arbitra-
tion.21 That is truly mandatory arbitration. Arbitration arising out of
an adhesion contract is not.22
II. FAA Preemption of State Jury-Trial Provisions
As noted above, section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires
courts to enforce arbitration agreements "save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 23 FAA
19. See Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 5, at 729-30 ("As I have argued elsewhere, the
Federal Arbitration Act was never intended to permit companies to impose arbitration on
unknowing consumers and employees, but rather was merely intended to allow two sophis-
ticated businesses to enter into pre-dispute arbitration agreements.").
20. Sternlight has stated that "it is critical to distinguish between commercial arbitra-
tion voluntarily agreed to by parties of approximately equal bargaining power, and com-
mercial arbitration forced upon unknowing consumers, franchisees, employees or others
through the use of form contracts." Panacea, supra note 5, at 642-43. But what is the mea-
sure of "bargaining power?" How do we know when the parties have an "approximately
equal" amount of it? As Richard Craswell points out, the phrase "unequal bargaining
power.., has never been successfully defined." Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability
Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 50 n.99 (1993). Those
who use the term seem to use it as a euphemism for wealth and experience in business.
Parties with substantial wealth and experience in business are described as having more
"bargaining power" than parties with little wealth and experience in business. See, e.g.,
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1249
(1983) (equating "gross inequality of bargaining power" with "a wide disparity of economic
resources"); see also Panacea, supra note 5, at 637 & n.1 (contrasting "large companies such
as banks, hospitals, brokerage houses and even pest exterminators" with "customers, em-
ployees, franchisees and other little guys"). But why it is voluntary to contract with someone
of approximately equal wealth and experience in business but mandatory to contract with
someone who has more of these things is unexplained.
21. Ware, supra note 10, § 2.55(b)(1).
22. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Con-
sumer Right Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. Rv. 33, 37 n.10 (1997)
(" 'Compulsory' or 'mandatory' arbitration refers to situations where arbitration is imposed
by law, without individual assent by contract, and should not be confused with pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.").
23. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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section 2 applies to nearly all arbitration agreements2 4 and, like all
federal law, preempts inconsistent state law. 25 The FAA does not, how-
ever, preempt all state law pertaining to arbitration agreements. As
the Supreme Court explained in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,26
[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agree-
ments without contravening [FAA] § 2.... Courts may not, how-
ever, invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable
only to arbitration provisions.... By enacting § 2, we have several
times said, Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration
provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions
be piaced "upon the same footing as other contracts." 27
This legal doctrine is the stumbling block for Professor Sternlight
and other opponents of the contractual approach to arbitration law.
The FAA makes enforcement of arbitration agreements turn on con-
tract law's standards of consent. By contrast, Sternlight and other crit-
ics of the FAA argue that enforcement of arbitration agreements
should turn on other, more exacting standards of consent, such as the
knowing-consent standards that many courts apply to jury-waiver
clauses. 28 For example, Sternlight argues that "to the extent that the
state enforces civil jury trial waivers only if they are knowing, volun-
tary, and intelligent, that same standard should be applied to arbitra-
tion clauses." 29
Sternlight anticipates that "defenders of mandatory arbitration
[who are they?] will argue that the FAA preempts reliance on state
constitutional jury trial provisions. °3 0 To rebut this argument, Ster-
nlight reads both the text of FAA section 2 and the Supreme Court's
decision in Casarotto narrowly.
The [Casarotto Court] explained that "[c]ourts may not... invali-
date arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbi-
tration provisions."
Thus, the Court has consistently contrasted general state laws
regarding unconscionability or fraud, which clearly can be used to
invalidate arbitration clauses, and those state laws that substantively
24. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-73 (1995); see also
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984).
25. See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
26. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
27. Id. at 686-87 (citations omitted); see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938,944 (1995) ("When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain
matter ... courts generally ... should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the
formation of contracts.").
28. See Arbitration Clauses, supra note 3, § III.B.
29. Sternlight, supra note 8, at 33.
30. Id. at 35.
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or procedurally single out arbitration contracts for invalidation. To
the extent courts hold that only those state statutes or constitutions
that target arbitration are preempted, no problem is posed for the
use ofjury trial waiver standards. Clearly those waiver standards are
designed to govern contracts in general, and not specifically to un-
dermine arbitration clauses.3 1
That is the doctrinal point to which the organizers of this sympo-
sium have asked me to respond.
A response has already been suggested by Professor Sternlight
who writes that "defenders of mandatory arbitration [again, who are
they?] may argue that jury trial waiver provisions are not saved from
preemption because they do not apply generally to all kinds of con-
tracts in a given state. '3 2 Yes, indeed.
Professor Sternlight is surely correct about the easy cases on both
extremes. The easy case on one extreme is a ground for the revoca-
tion of any contract, such as unconscionability or fraud. Such grounds
are plainly not preempted by the FAA.33 The easy case on the other
extreme is a ground for the revocation of an arbitration agreement,
but for no other contract-at all. Such grounds are plainly preempted
by the FAA. There is a wide consensus on these easy cases at the
extremes.
34
The harder case is the one in the middle, a ground for the revo-
cation of a contract containing an arbitration clause and some other
type(s) of contracts, but not of "any contract."35 An example is a
ground that is available for the revocation of a contract containing an
arbitration clause and a contract containing a jury-waiver clause, but
that is not available for the revocation of any other contract. This ex-
ample, of course, includes the state constitutional jury-trial provisions
cited by Sternlight. But Sternlight does not find this example a hard
case. She reads FAA preemption narrowly so that there are only easy
31. Id. at 36.
32. Id. at 37.
33. Some uses of the unconscionability doctrine, however, would be preempted. See
generally WARE, supra note 10, § 2.25(b).
34. The above-quoted portion of Casarotto states the positive-law answers to these easy
questions. See supra text accompanying note 27. And in this regard, Casarotto wasjust restat-
ing what the Supreme Court had stated in 1987. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93
n.9 (1987) ("[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable [to arbitra-
tion agreements] if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely
from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement
of [FAA] § 2.") (emphasis in original).
35. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. (forth-
coming 2004) (discussing state statutes requiring that any arbitration proceeding or court
case be brought in state).
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cases: either the ground singles out arbitration agreements and no
other kinds of contracts at all, in which case it is easily preempted, or
the ground applies to at least one contract lacking an arbitration
clause, in which case it is easily not preempted.
By contrast, I am not sure how the hard case should be resolved.
On the one hand, I see the sense in limiting preemption to grounds
that target arbitration rather than some other (alleged) evil. Ster-
nlight cites an example I used several years ago:
If state law requires the technical terms of all contracts to be ex-
plained in plain English, then application of that requirement to
arbitration clauses merely places arbitration agreements on the
same footing as other contracts [and is, therefore, not preempted
by the FAA]. If, however, state law enforces unexplained technical
terms in other contracts, then it may not require more of arbitra-
tion clauses. Doing so . . . is ... preempted by the FAA.3
6
With respect to this example, I wrote that "[t]o avoid FAA pre-
emption, a state law would not have to require explanations of techni-
cal terms in, literally, all contracts. If the requirement applied to all
'consumer' contracts or all 'credit agreements,' then it would apply to
arbitration clauses in the relevant class of contracts."3 7
I am not sure whether I still believe that. I keep coming back to
the statutory language that says "any contract. ' 38 To be a permissible
ground for the revocation of an arbitration agreement, it must be a
ground for the revocation of "any contract." Not "any contract in the
relevant class of contracts," but "any contract." If we are to take statu-
tory language seriously then I think state jury-trial provisions are, with
respect to arbitration agreements, preempted unless there is a way
around that word "any." If the results of taking statutory language seri-
ously displease us, then we can and should ask the legislature to
amend the statutory language.
One might also distinguish, for purposes of FAA preemption,
plain-English provisions from jury-trial provisions. The essence of the
attack on arbitration, after all, is that it deprives consumers, employ-
ees, and other "little guys" (as Sternlight describes them) 39 of a jury
trial which, presumably, would be more favorable to the little guy than
arbitration. 40
36. Arbitration After Doctor's Assocs., supra note 18, at 1031.
37. Id. at 1031 n.210 (emphasis in original).
38. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
39. Panacea, supra note 5, at 637 n.1.
40. In fact, the empirical evidence on this presumption is mixed. See, e.g., Effects of
Gilmer, supra note 18, at 750-57.
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By contrast, the purposes of plain-English provisions are at most
slightly related to the attack on arbitration. No matter how plainly ar-
bitration is explained to the little guy, Professor Sternlight and her
allies do not want the little guy to be presented with take-it-or-leave-it
arbitration clauses. This became especially clear to me a couple of
years ago when I noticed at a conference that Professor Sternlight had
a Gateway computer even though Gateway's contracts have arbitration
clauses. I asked Jean why she chose Gateway when there are other fine
computer brands that do not require their customers to agree to arbi-
tration.41 Jean's reply, and here I paraphrase, was something like "I
should not have to switch computers in order to avoid arbitration."
The point for present purposes is that, in Jean Sternlight's view,
even a consumer who needs no plain-English explanation of arbitra-
tion-because she knows full well that there is an arbitration clause in
the contract and knows as well as anyone what arbitration entails-
should not be bound by the arbitration clause. She does not believe
consumers should have to think about arbitration when shopping.
She does not believe that arbitration should enter into the mix of pros
and cons consumers weigh-along with price, quality, warranty, ser-
vice, etc.-when making decisions. Even conceding for the sake of ar-
gument that arbitration clauses lower prices to consumers, 42 she does
not want individual consumers to be free to choose between the high-
price/no-arbitration option and the low-price/arbitration option. She
wants the law to prohibit the second option, forcing consumers to
take the first option.43 That is mandatory. Freedom of contract is vol-
untary, while consumer "protection" laws, whatever their merits, are
mandatory.
So I conclude by saying that I am not sure whether the FAA
preempts state laws (such as constitutional jury-trial provisions) that
constitute a ground for the revocation of a contract containing an ar-
bitration clause and some other type(s) of contracts, but not of "any
contract." I am sure, however, that I do not advocate mandatory
arbitration.
41. Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European
Union and the United States, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 357, 377-83 (2002).
42. See generally Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming 2003) text at notes 132-46. For my argument that arbitration does
lower prices, see generally, Paying the Price, supra note 18.
43. Of course, Professor Sternlight might be happy for businesses to offer a low-price/
no-arbitration option but, by definition, businesses do not do so if we assume that arbitra-
tion lowers prices.
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